Suppose an agent is modeled by a 'behavioral welfare relation'that aggregates the di¤erent preferences that the agent reveals when choosing at di¤erent times or frames: x is better than y if the agent never chooses y when x is available and sometimes chooses x. In many behavioral applications, the options that are ranked superior to an alternative by this relation will be supported by multiple supporting price vectors. As a consequence, in a society of such agents the set of Pareto optimal allocations can be large and even have the same dimension as the set of all allocations. A policymaker will then not be able to use Pareto optimality to discriminate locally among allocations. A small distortion, for example, will call for no policy response.
Introduction
In the face of individual behavior that violates the principles of economic rationality, behavioral economists have often disaggregated an individual into a set of agents acting at di¤erent times or 'frames.' An individual who displays an endowment e¤ect becomes a set of agents, one preference relation for each endowment (Tversky and Kahneman (1991) ; a hyperbolic discounter becomes a set of agents, one utility function for each point in time; and so on. One drawback of this disaggregation is that the de…nition of welfare becomes problematic. If the agents who choose at di¤erent frames disagree on how to rank outcomes, which agent rules? The natural answer, for economists, is to apply the Pareto criterion. Rangel (2007, 2008 ) o¤er a detailed theory of welfare economics, applicable in principle to any choice behavior, that infers that an individual is weakly better o¤ with x than y if and only if no agent at any frame chooses y over x and at least one agent at one frame does choose x over y. Salant and Rubinstein (2008) propose a similar model though geared to the positive task of seeing when an individual's choices can be explained as the product of rational agents choosing at separate frames. Mandler (2004a Mandler ( , 2005 argues that a uni…ed view of individual welfare can be preserved if an individual is described by an incomplete preference relation: the individual's preference judgments consist only of those rankings about which the disaggregated agents unanimously agree.
In this paper, we consider whether a welfare economics built on these foundations is su¢ ciently decisive. The above models all take the view that if the disaggregated versions of an individual i who choose at di¤erent frames disagree about how to rank outcomes x and y then individual i does not have a welfare ranking of x and y; we will then say that individual i's 'behavioral welfare relation'% i is incomplete. For a society of individuals, each with a behavioral welfare relation, the incompleteness of the % i can cripple the Pareto criterion; the set of Pareto optimal allocations can be very large and indeed can have the same dimension as the set of allocations. Since the Pareto criterion then locally makes no discriminations, it does a poor job of identifying acceptable allocations of goods: every allocation in the neighborhood of an optimum is another optimum. Moreover, policymakers need not respond to changes in the environment. For example, if the government selects a Pareto optimum and the model is perturbed slightly, say by the addition of a small externality, then typically the initial optimum will remain optimal: even a paradigmatic distortion does not call for a policy response.
The expansion of the set of Pareto optima stems from the incompleteness of the behavioral welfare relation % i , which makes it di¢ cult to …nd Pareto improvements and hence easier to declare an allocation Pareto optimal. But not any variety of incompleteness will lead to trouble. The key ingredient is that agents'behavioral welfare relations have multiple supporting prices: the boundary of the set of bundles that are % i -superior to an arbitrary bundle must be kinked. We will argue through a series of examples that this pattern is common in behavioral models where the agents who choose at di¤erent frames have divergent preferences.
Formally, the characterization we give of the dimension of the set of Pareto optima can be detached from the fact that each behavioral welfare relation % i originates from a set of disaggregated agents choosing at di¤erent frames. Our results apply to any general equilibrium model with preferences that meet the multiple-supporting-prices assumptions that behavioral welfare relation satisfy. In this regard, several of our points follow in the footsteps of Rigotti and Shannon (2005) . They characterize the Pareto set in economies with uncertainty where preferences are incomplete because agents possess sets of probability distributions, as in Bewley (1986) (see also Dana (2004) for a similar but more speci…c case). Our characterization of the optimal allocations via intersecting sets of supporting price vectors in section 4 parallels this treatment. Billot et al. (2000) use a similar construction. See also Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) .
The large multiplicity of the Pareto set in the neighborhood of speci…c allocations could be deduced from the Rigotti and Shannon (2005) treatment. Our goal, however, is to show that a large multiplicity obtains in the neighborhood of almost every optimum. We therefore face the technical hurdle that boundary Pareto optima inevitably arise where agents' sets of supporting prices 'just' overlap, i.e., where the interiors of agents' sets of supporting prices do not intersect. In these troublesome cases, a Pareto optimum need not be surrounded by a full-dimensional (open) set of other optima. But a global analysis of the Pareto optima, in section 5, will show that generically the troublesome cases constitute only a measure zero subset of the Pareto optima. Our analysis mostly assumes that agents'sets of supporting prices is full-dimensional, as in Rigotti and Shannon. In section 6, we consider the dimension of the optima that occurs when sets of supporting prices have smaller dimension.
Behavioral welfare and multiple supporting prices
We consider an agent who chooses from a variety of sets A, where each A is a subset of some family of conceivable choice alternatives X. Each time the agent selects from some A an 'ancillary'condition or 'frame'f is present that can a¤ect the agent's behavior. Let c(A; f ) be the nonempty subset of A that the agent chooses when the frame is f and let F denote the domain of (A; f ) pairs for which the agent's choices can be observed. A prime case of a frame occurs when choice is a¤ected by some alternative in A that the agent views as the status quo. In this case, f denotes the status quo option and each
We have adopted the 'frame' terminology and notation from Salant and Rubinstein (2008) . The following de…nition of behavioral welfare, the main subject of this paper, is a slight adaptation of the analogous concept in Bernheim and Rangel (2008) .
De…nition 1
The behavioral welfare relation %, a binary relation on X, is de…ned by
y 2 c(A; f ) =) x 2 c(A; f ) for all (A; f ) 2 F with x; y 2 A , x 2 c(A; f ) for some (A; f ) 2 F with x; y 2 A .
So x % y obtains if, whenever x and y are both available, we never see y chosen without
x also being chosen and x is sometimes chosen. The strict behavioral welfare relation is de…ned by x y () (x % y and not y % x). So we make the welfare inference x y if the agent sometimes chooses x and not y and never chooses y and not x. Think of each decision at each (A; f ) as being made by a separate agent and interpret the observation (x 2 c(A; f ), y 2 A) to indicate that the (A; f ) individual weakly or strictly prefers x over y according to whether y 2 c(A; f ) or y = 2 c(A; f ). Then x y obtains only when all of the agents who reveal a preference between x and y at least weakly prefer x and at least one strictly prefers x: in this sense, x y indicates a Pareto improvement for the individual's frame-based selves. 1 Even when agents are not classical economic maximizers, it is often straightforward to link an observation of x y to the agent's belief that he or she experiences greater welfare with x than y. Suppose that an agent endowed with a status quo option is o¤ered the chance to switch to some alternative. Then a (A; f ) takes the form (fx; yg; x), where
x is the status quo, acceptance of the o¤er to switch is indicated by c(fx; yg; x) = fyg and rejection is c(fx; yg; x) = fxg. Suppose the agent, unlike a classical maximizer, is sometimes is unable to form a preference judgment and is instead governed by inertia, sticking to the status quo. Then, if we observe fxg = c(fx; yg; x) we would not have grounds to infer the agent weakly or strictly prefers x to y, just that it is not the case that the agent prefers y to x. But when we see the agent actively repudiate the status quo, fyg = c(fx; yg; x), and if in addition fyg = c(fx; yg; y), then it is reasonable to infer that the agent does strictly prefer y to x. These common-sense inferences match the % de…nition of individual welfare: if c(fx; yg; x) and c(fx; yg; y) agree -say this option is y -then we deduce y x while if c(fx; yg; x) 6 = c(fx; yg; y), then we infer neither x % y nor y % x. So in this example % is simply the union of the preference judgments that the agent can be unambiguously observed to make.
Given the Pareto-like nature of %, the incompleteness of % that can occur in the above example is typical. In a more general setting where A can be an arbitrary subset of X, all that is needed for neither x % y nor y % x to obtain is that there is a (A; f ) with (x 2 c(A; f ); y 2 A; y = 2 c(A; f )) and a (A 0 ; f 0 ) with (y 2 c(
1 There are other plausible de…nitions for a strict behavioral welfare relation, most prominently, to say that x y obtains when x % y and, for all (A; f ) 2 F with x; y 2 A , y = 2 c(A; f ), that is, when the individual sometimes chooses x when y is available and never chooses y when x is available. Bernheim and Rangel (2008) advocate a strict behavioral welfare relation that, under a minor domain restriction on c, coincides with . Notice that if x y then x y, but not vice versa. It will therefore be easier, when we consider societies of many individuals, to …nd Pareto improvements when rather than de…nes strict improvements for individuals. Hence it will be harder to declare an allocation to a Pareto optimum when de…nes strict improvements. This is our sole reason for using rather than : to
give a convincing case that the set of Pareto optima is large, we must when possible bias the playing …eld to minimize the number of Pareto optima.
For our main point -that % can make so few rankings that Pareto optimality will not discriminate adequately among policy options -simple incompleteness is not enough. A particular form of incompleteness, where multiple price vectors support the bundles that are %-superior to any given reference bundle, is required.
We henceforth narrow our focus to agents who choose bundles of L goods: X will be
In standard consumer theory, if a preference relation R on R L has a concave utility representation then, given an arbitrary bundle x, there is a 'price'vector p such that yRx implies p (y x) 0 and we then say that 'p supports the bundles that are R-superior to
x.' If u is di¤erentiable at x then p must be a multiple of Du(x). Since concave functions on R L are di¤erentiable at almost every point in their domain, there will typically be only one p (up to multiplication by a scalar) that supports the R-superior bundles.
The situation is di¤erent for the behavioral welfare relation %: for most bundles x, not just an isolated few where di¤erentiability fails, there will be multiple nonproportional price vectors that support the bundles that are %-superior to x. Moreover, when there is more than one nonproportional supporting price vector there will be a continuum of such We turn to four examples that show why multiple supporting prices appear with the behavioral welfare relation %. To ensure that c(A; f ) is always well-de…ned, we assume without further remark that, for each (A; f ) 2 F, A is …nite. And, to avoid any extra supporting price vectors that do not stem from the multiplicity of frames, we assume that any utility function that appears at a single frame is di¤erentiable. Bernheim and Rangel (2008) derive % in Examples 2 and 3 but do not consider the set of supporting prices.
Example 1 (the willingness to accept-willingness to pay disparity) There are two commodities, a good y that an agent …nds di¢ cult to value, e.g., environmental quality, and money m. So X = R 2 + . A frame f is any status quo point (y; m), and accordingly we assume that the agent can always stick to the status quo (for any (A; (y; m)) 2 F, (y; m) 2 A). We also suppose that we can o¤er the agent any alternative to any status quo (F has all sets of the form (f(y; m); (y 0 ; m 0 )g; (y; m))). Given a status quo (y; m), suppose the agent will pay no more than p pay > 0 for each additional unit of y and will accept no less than p accept > 0 for each unit of y sacri…ced. The 'disparity'is that So, for increases in y, c(A; (y; m)) is bounded below by a line with slope p pay and, for decreases in y, by a line with slope p accept . Since p pay < p accept , the boundary is less steep for increases (see Figure 1 ). The kink in the boundary in Figure 1 is the key geometric feature that all of our examples share.
To check that multiple supporting prices obtain for %, suppose that 
Since (1) continues to hold if we replace p pay by any p > p pay and (2) continues to hold if we replace p accept by any p < p accept , we conclude that if (y 0 ; m 0 ) % (y; m) then
Thus any (p; 1) with p 2 [p pay ; p accept ] or any multiple of such a (p; 1) supports the bundles that are %-superior to (y; m), as in Figure 1 . 
Suppose each u f is quasiconcave. Then, …xing some x, there will be a p f 2 R L such
So if p is any positive linear combination of the p f , p = P f 2F f p f where each f 0, then p supports the %-superior bundles, i.e., p (z x) 0. As long as at least two of the p f are linearly independent, the multiplicity of supporting prices will not consist of mere rescalings. See Figure 2 for a L = 2, #F = 2 example.
Example 3 (hyperbolic discounting) An agent consumes a sequence x = (x 1 ; :::; x T )
from date 1 to T 3 with one good per date:
A frame is a date t at which choice is made. At each t, consumption prior to t has already occurred and so the agent can choose only from sets that have sequences that specify the same consumption from 1 to t 1. So we admit (A; t) into F if and only if t is a date between 1 and T and A is any …nite set of bundles in R T + that share the same values prior to t (if x; y 2 A then x i = y i for i < t). Hyperbolic discounting (see Laibson (1997) , O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999)) means that there are ; 2 (0; 1) and a di¤erentiable, concave function u such that the date t agent maximizes
So c(A; t) equals the set of x in A that maximize U t .
The agents that appear at t > 1 reveal preferences only on those subspaces of R T + where the consumption of the goods that appear before t is …xed. So, while the bundles that are U 1 -superior to an arbitrary x 2 R T + will form a full T -dimensional set, the set of bundles that are U t -superior to x, where t > 1, will have dimension less than T . Consequently, the set of prices that support the bundles that are %-superior to x will not be restricted by the choices of the agents at dates 2; :::; T .
The situation becomes more interesting once at least one time period has passed: if t 1 > 0 dates have passed, with (x 1 ; :::; x t 1 ) consumed, then the choices of the agents at dates 1; :::; t will reveal complete preferences over the remaining T (t 1) goods that have yet to be consumed. Let bundles now be points in R and any i = 1; :::; t, there is
And, again as in Example 2, any p equal to a positive linear combination of the p i , p = P t i=1 i p i , will support the %-superior bundles. While the vectors p 1 ; :::; p t 1 are collinear, p t will be linearly independent of these vectors: for any agent j t 1 and agent t,
is a multiple of (Du(x t ); Du(x t+1 ); :::; T t Du(x T )) and DU t (x) is a multiple of (Du(x t ); Du(x t+1 ); :::; T t Du(x T )). So the multiplicity of supporting prices is not a mere rescaling. Bernheim and Rangel (2008, Theorem 11) is a similar result.
Example 4 (abstract status quo bias) An agent has a quasiconcave utility function u : R L ! R and the frame f is a status quo bundle x. As in Example 1, the agent is always allowed to stick to the status quo (for any (A; x) 2 F, x 2 A) and we can o¤er the agent any alternative to any status quo (F contains all sets of the form (fx; yg; x)). y % x and y 6 = x then y 2 c(fx; yg; x) and hence u(y) > u(x) + (x). Given that u is quasiconcave, it follows that for every x there is a p x such that p x (y x) 0 for all y with u(y) u(x). If u is strictly concave, it is easy to use the last two sentences to show that, for any p su¢ ciently near p x , p (y x) 0 for all y with y % x (see Figure 3) . We thus have a multiplicity of supporting prices. 2 The agents at dates t and later may impose further restrictions if x and y are equal at some set of coordinates that begin at t, but the t inequalities we have written must always hold. Each of the above examples displays a multiplicity of supporting prices that goes beyond the simple rescaling that occurs in standard consumer theory. Since rescalings have no bearing on the set of Pareto optimal allocations, we eliminate them by now requiring any supporting p to lie in the unit circle S fp 2 R L :
, where L is the number of goods.
The set of supporting prices at x for the relation % is given by
We de…ne the dimension of N (x) to be the maximum number of linearly independent vectors in N (x) minus 1: any convex combination of these vectors, when rescaled to lie in S, will be an element of N (x). Since S is a L 1 dimensional set, the dimension of
We will concentrate on sets of supporting prices N (x) that, at any x, have the maximum dimension L 1. Then, on any two-dimensional plane through x, the set fy : y % xg will display a kink at x. The maximum dimension L 1 obtains in Examples 1 and 4.
Furthermore, if we extend Example 1 to more than two goods, then N (x) will have dimension L 1 if a WTA-WTP disparity holds for each of the L 1 nonmoney goods and % is convex. For dimension L 1 to obtain in Example 2, there must be at least L frames to ensure that there are L linearly independent p f vectors (and, ‡ukes aside, if there are at least L frames then the dimension will be L 1). Finally, in Example 3 and assuming that t 1 > 0 time periods have passed, the dimension of N (x) is 1. As indicated in the example, the collinearity of the vectors DU 1 (x); :::DU t 1 (x) constrains the multiplicity of supporting prices.
The moral of the examples is that are cases when it is plausible for the dimension of supporting prices to be the maximum L 1, there are cases where a variety of dimensions are plausible, and …nally there are cases where the maximum dimension de…nitely will not obtain. For most of this paper, however, we assume that N (x) has maximal dimension, for the simple reason that the lower dimensional cases introduce no new mathematical or conceptual issues. As we discuss in section 6, if the dimension of N (x) drops from A binary relation R that has a set of supporting prices of dimension L 1 at a single x just indicates a kink in the boundary of fy : yRxg, which can occur with a standard preference relation. Indeed, if R is a complete, transitive, and convex preference relation, multiple supporting prices must be a rare event: since fy : yRxg is convex, a line along this set's lower boundary must be di¤erentiable almost everywhere. The distinctive feature of the behavioral welfare relation %, in contrast, is that maximal supporting prices can occur on open sets: the incompleteness of the behavioral welfare relation % allows the multiplicity of supporting prices to be systematic.
Further properties of behavioral welfare
Beyond multiple supporting prices, the examples in the previous section show that further assumptions on % can be well-founded. For our purposes, the convexity of % is the most important. Since we cannot assume that % is complete, transitive, or continuous we use a more detailed version of convexity (which, in standard consumer theory, is implied by the traditional convexity assumption). In Example 2, % will satisfy the convexity condition if each u f is quasiconcave and continuous and, in Example 3, % will satisfy the convexity condition if u is concave.
In these examples, the convexity condition is no more or less implausible than convexity traditionally is. In Example 4, the convexity condition fails (but see our further discussion of this example in section 4).
De…nition 4 The relation
We have so far considered speci…c examples that impose structure on %. Does the fact that % is derived from a set of c(A; f ) observations entail restrictions on % that we must therefore assume are satis…ed? Suppose that for each one-or two-element A X there is a f such that (A; f ) 2 F. The inclusion of the singleton A's implies that % must be re ‡exive and so we assume (without further remark) that any behavioral welfare relation % in this paper is re ‡exive. But there are no further restrictions on %. For any re ‡exive relation R on X, set x 2 c(fx; yg; f ) if and only if xRy and c(A; f ) = A for all A with #A 3. Then % = R.
Pareto optimality
Suppose now there is a society of agents I = f1; :::; Ig. When a notation from the previous sections carries a i subscript, it refers to the same type of point or set but for the particular individual i. For the remainder of the paper, we …x the set of alternatives While we rely on welfare theorem arguments, we unfortunately cannot use o¤-the-shelf versions: the relation % i can fail to be complete or continuous in even the most-behaved example, and, in principle at least, can fail to be transitive. 5 An allocation x is a quasiequilibrium if there is a p with p 2 N i (x i ) for all i 2 I.
Proposition 1
If each % i satis…es the convexity condition and at least one % i is nonsatiated, then any Pareto optimum is a quasiequilibrium.
Proposition 1, which is a version of the second welfare theorem, makes do with such weak assumptions -no continuity, completeness, or transitivity -because optima are 4 For results on the existence of Pareto optima in incomplete-preferences environments, see Mandler (2004b); some continuity assumptions are needed. See also Proposition 3. 5 If we strengthen our nonsatiation assumptions, we could adapt Fon and Otani (1979) to prove Proposition 1.
required only to be quasiequilibria, not full equilibria, and because of our strengthened version of convexity. We have not yet assumed that the % i satisfy maximal supporting prices.
Let intN i (x i ) denote the interior of N i (x i ) relative to S (the set of prices normalized to length 1). Since S has dimension L 1, intN i (x i ) must also have dimension L 1 if it is nonempty.
De…nition 5
The relation % i has continuous supporting prices at x i if x n i ! x i and p 2 intN i (x i ) imply there is a n 0 such that, for n > n 0 , p 2 intN i (x n i ).
In words, continuous supporting prices holds when a p in intN i (x i ) cannot jump outside of the set of supporting prices at all bundles arbitrarily near x i .
De…nition 6
The allocation x is a robust Pareto optimum if (1) there is a p such that p 2 intN i (x i ) for each i 2 I, and (2) each % i has continuous supporting prices at x i .
Requiring that a Pareto optimum x is robust is stronger than assuming each % i has maximal supporting prices in a neighborhood of x i : there must be among the p's given by Proposition 1 a p that is in the interior of each N i (x i ).
Proposition 2 Any robust Pareto optimum is contained in an open and hence L(I 1)-
dimensional set of Pareto optima.
The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward: given a robust Pareto optimum x, both x and any nearby allocation x 0 can be supported by the same price vector, and hence, by applying a version of the …rst welfare theorem, x 0 will also be a Pareto optimum. In the next section, we show that most Pareto optima are robust.
Notice the contrast between Proposition 2 and the size of the Pareto set in the standard general equilibrium model: in an economy of I agents with complete, transitive, strictly convex, and monotone preferences the set of Pareto optima has dimension I 1 (Arrow and Hahn (1971)).
Example 5 (abstract status quo bias revisited) Example 4 fails to satisfy our convexity condition and so our arguments in this section and the next do not apply. For this example, however, the conclusion that the set of Pareto optima contains a set of maximal dimension is very simple. Let each i 2 I in an economy satisfy abstract status quo bias de…ned via continuous u i and i functions, leading to the behavioral welfare relation % i . Now suppose x is a Pareto optimum for the economy that consists of the same set of agents I but where each i has the complete preference relation represented by u i (so i always chooses a u i -maximizing bundle without requiring that a change from a status quo x i delivers a i (x i ) utility premium). Since a y with y i % i x i for each i 2 I has u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) if y i 6 = x i , any y that Pareto dominates x in the original economy with abstract status quo bias must also Pareto dominate x in the complete-preferences economy. Such a y must therefore be infeasible and hence x must be a Pareto optimum for the abstract-status-quo-bias economy. Moreover, if x n ! x then for all n su¢ ciently large x n must be a Pareto optimum for the abstract-status-quo-bias economy. For if there were a sequence y n where each y n Pareto dominates x n then any accumulation point y of y n must Pareto dominate x in the complete-preferences economy, contradicting the optimality of x. 
The robust optima are generic
We can characterize the robust and nonrobust optima and visualize which case is more likely using the concept of transversal intersection. Suppose that % i displays maximal supporting prices and is smooth in the sense that the boundary of N i (x i ) is a smooth (L 2)-dimensional surface. If A and B are two subsets of S (the set of price vectors with length 1), they intersect transversally, which we write A t B, if the linear subspaces in R L that best approximate A and B at any point of common intersection y together span the linear subspace in R L that best approximates S at y.
Consider the simplest case where the economy consists of two agents i and j. If x is a Pareto optimum then N i (x i ) and N j (x j ) have a common price vector. If in addition
, then x is a robust optimum. To see why, observe that an optimal x will fail to be robust if and only if N i (x i ) \ N j (x j ) consists only of price vectors that 6 For each agent i, u i (y n i ) u i (x n i ), and taking a subsequence if necessary there must be an agent j for which u j (y n j ) u j (x n j ) + j (x n j ); hence in the limit u i (y i ) u i (x i ) for all i and u j (y j ) u j (x j ) + j (x j ).
are on the boundaries of both N i (x i ) and N j (x j ): in this case, N i (x i ) and N j (x j ) are tangent and hence N i (x i ) t N j (x j ) does not obtain (see Figure 4) . 7 Now if we perturb i's and j's sets of supporting prices N i (x i ) and N i (x j ) then at any given allocation x a failure of transversal intersection will be an exceptional event. But failures of transversal intersection at some x can be unavoidable. As x moves along some path in Y , N i (x i ) and N j (x j ) can switch from being disjoint to intersecting transversally, with nontransversal intersection necessarily occurring at some transition point. Since the qualitative fact of the switch from N i (x i ) and N j (x j ) being disjoint to intersecting cannot be perturbed away, nontransversal intersection at some allocation will be unavoidable.
But although the Pareto optima where N i (x i ) and N j (x j ) are tangent cannot be dismissed, they are unusual in the class of Pareto optima. Consider the set of pairs of allocations and supporting prices for each individual i,
We will show (in the proof of Proposition 3) that generically the sets M i and M j intersect transversally, M i t M j . Then, although nonrobust optima are not at all pathological, for any nonrobust optimum x there will always be a nearby optimum To make the above arguments rigorous, we require the M i to be manifolds. We say that the relation % i is smooth if M i is a smooth (C 1 ) manifold with boundary. To formalize what it means for a model to be typical or generic, we specify a parameter space of economies.
De…nition 7 A smooth maximal-supporting-prices economy is an endowment e 2 R L ++ and a pro…le of behavioral welfare relations (% 1 ; :::; % I ) such that (1) each % i satis…es the 7 A failure of transversality can occur only due to a p that is on boundary of both N i (x i ) and N j (x j ).
and p is in the interior (relative to S) of N k (x k ) for either k = i or k = j then the linear subspace that best approximates N k (x k ) at p by itself locally spans all of S at p. convexity condition, is nonsatiated and smooth, and has maximal supporting prices (2) there exists a Pareto optimum.
Condition (2) (1) in De…nition 7 and, using the product topology, of smooth maximal-supporting-prices economies. The convergence of % n i requires only that the sets of supporting prices at every bundle converge, not that the behavioral welfare relations themselves converge. We could require this sense of convergence as well, but it is not necessary for our purposes. It is noteworthy that the tools of di¤erential topology prove so useful in modeling economies when agents have multiple supporting prices. Although the sets of bundles that are % i -superior to the x i are inherently kinked, smooth techniques can nevertheless be applied to the prices that support these bundles. See Mas-Colell (1985) for precedents in the theory of production that suggested the present approach.
Partial multiplicity of supporting prices
So far we have considered behavioral welfare relations that display maximal supporting prices: given some x i , the bundles that are % i -superior to x i in any two-dimensional plane through x i will display a kink at x i . What of the cases, mentioned in section 2, where the multiplicity of supporting prices concerns only a subset of goods? We show here what it means for there to be multiple supporting prices for only a subset of goods and calculate the dimension of the set of Pareto optima that results. To ensure that the only source of extra dimensions of optima are the goods with multiple supporting prices, we will suppose that the % i , when restricted to the goods that do not display multiple supporting prices, are completely orthodox.
Let p k denote (p 1 ; :::; p k 1 ; p k+1 ; :::; p L ), and, for p 2 S, let S k (p) denote fq 2 S :
A Pareto optimum x is robust if (1) there is a p such that, for each agent i, p 2
) when % i displays multiple supporting prices for good k at x, and
is a manifold with boundary.
Condition (2) is comparable to the continuous supporting prices assumption in section 4.
We have not and do not assume that each individual displays multiple supporting prices for the same set of goods.
Given an allocation z, let R nmp i (z) denote the bundles such that only the goods for which % i does not display multiple supporting prices at z are allowed to vary from z i :
(z). Letting S nmp (z) denote fp 2 S : p(k) 6 = 0 =) for some j 2 I, % j does not display multiple supporting prices for k at zg, each % i (z) and
Suppose each i does not display multiple supporting prices for all goods at some allocation z. Then, if each i's conditional preferences are su¢ ciently well-behaved, and we constrain each i's consumption of the goods for which % i does display multiple supporting prices to equal the levels speci…ed by z, the allocations that are Pareto optimal given these constraints will normally form a set of dimension I 1.
De…nition 9
An allocation z has a well-behaved conditional economy if (1) the set of conditional optima, P O nmp (z) fx 2 R nmp (z) : x is a Pareto optimum for the economy (e; % i (z) i2I )g, is a I 1 dimensional manifold, (2) for each x 2 P O nmp (z) the set of supporting prices
Instead of imposing De…nition 9, it would be su¢ cient for our purposes to assume that each % i (z) is strictly convex, monotone, continuous, di¤erentiable, complete, and transitive, and that the % i (z) taken together satisfy a 'no isolated communities'condition (see Arrow and Hahn (1971) or Mas-Colell (1985) for a detailed treatment). 8 To satisfy De…nition 9, it will normally be necessary that each % i does not display multiple supporting prices for at least one good.
Given an allocation z, let mp(k; i) = 1 if % i displays multiple supporting prices for good k at z and mp(k; i) = 0 otherwise, and let M P k (z) = max[ P i2I mp(k; i) 1; 0].
Proposition 4
If each i's behavioral welfare relation satis…es the convexity condition and x is a robust Pareto optimum that has a well-behaved conditional economy, then x is contained in a set of optima of dimension I 1 + P L k=1 M P k (x).
Conclusion
If we build a behavioral welfare relation for each agent i where i's ranking of options requires unanimity among the frames at which i chooses, the set of Pareto optimal allocations can be very large. In the polar case where agents'behavioral welfare relations are supported by a maximal set of prices, the dimension of the Pareto optima will equal the dimension of the entire commodity space.
The problems we have considered in this paper do not plague all versions of behavioral welfare economics. If we could make interpersonal comparisons of utility across the agents that appear at di¤erent frames, then we could aggregate the frame-based preferences into a complete preference relation for any individual i. Kahneman et al. (1997) is an attempt in this direction. The present problems are in fact a particular di¢ culty of the Pareto criterion. Pareto optimality is widely seen to be an impractical policy guide due to the fact that policymakers never know with certainty the preferences of the individuals they are dealing with; to avoid making interpersonal comparisons of utility, policymakers must look for policy changes that do not harm any of the preference relations that individuals might potentially have. Such a test is so demanding that virtually any policy can be labeled Pareto optimal. The current di¢ culties are similar. When we use the behavioral welfare relation % i to measure i's welfare, we are in e¤ect insisting that no agent at any frame is harmed by a policy change. We thus get a similar expansion of the set of agents and a similar expansion of the set of optima.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let x be a Pareto optimum and de…ne
Letting 1 be the index of the nonsatiated agent, there exists b x 1 1 x 1 and, by re ‡exivity (see section 3) and the convexity condition,
. Set near enough to 1 to ensure that
So there exists (z 1 ; :::; z I ) such that P i2I z i = z and z i % i x i for all i 2 I. By the convexity condition, x i % i x i for i = 2; :::; I. Given that
x could not be a Pareto optimum. (1) Given M ex i and = ( 1 ; :::; I ) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1) , de…ne
where ( i ; x) is the ball in R L with center 0 and radius r(
is not an extreme point of B i (x i )g; and …nally, given some p 2 S, de…ne H p fy i 2 R L + : p (y i x i ) 0g. De…ne the re ‡exive relation % i; by setting
), the set of supporting prices at x for the relation % i; is N i (x; ). We have let the expansion of the N i shrink to 0 as diam there is a p such that p 2 N i (x i ) for all i 2 I. Hence for any 2 , x is a robust Pareto optimum for % i; , i 2 I. And since we have assumed that the original economy has a Pareto optimum, for any 2 the economy that results has a robust Pareto optimum.
Since n ! implies that each % i; n converges to % i; , the economies for which P O r is nonempty form a dense (and, self-evidently, open) set: property I is satis…ed. , and a
where b p 2 @N i (x; ) minimizes kp b pk, and (v) for 2 b ,
) is a submersion onto @M i ( ). (Here and subsequently @M i ( ) and intM i ( ) will refer to the boundary and interior of the manifold M i ( ).) Property (iv) is not essential, but it simpli…es the calculation of a derivative in (3).
(3) To show, for any
Since for 2 b , g i is a submersion onto @M i ( ), and @M i ( ) has dimension equal to generic. Apply the same logic to any pair (k; l) of agents and take the intersection of the resulting kl , thus arriving at a generic set 2 . Since for any 2 2 and any i; j; l 2 I, Hence any such y that is an optimum is a robust optimum. As in the previous paragraph, therefore, for any of these y that are optimal, T i2I int S N i (y; ) 6 = ?. Openness of the property of P O nr having measure 0 follows again from the compactness of Y .
Proof of Proposition 4. Let x be the robust optimum given in the Proposition.
Condition 2 of robustness implies that for z in a neighborhood of x the coordinates k of z i such that % i displays multiple supporting prices for good k at z do not change as a function of z. Therefore, since our analysis is local, we can just refer to the coordinates for which % i displays multiple supporting prices: for any i 2 I and any z 2 R LI or z i 2 R L , z 2i will denote the coordinates of z i for which % i displays multiple supporting prices and z 1i will denote the remaining coordinates of z i . Since % i (z) = % i (y) whenever z 2i = y 2i , we write % i (z 2i ) instead of % i (z). Given z 2 R LI and a = 1; 2, let z a denote (z a1 ; :::; z aI ).
Since x is a robust optimum, there is a p such that if % i displays multiple supporting prices for k at x then p 2 int S k (p) (N i (x i ) \ S k (p)). Since we have assumed that, for any z 2 , P O nmp (z 2 ) fz 1 : z 1 is a Pareto optimum for (e; % i (z 2i ) i2I )g has dimension I 1, the set fx 0 2 Y : x 
